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Abstract 
 
 The objective of this study is to examine the stability of a general  
equilibrium model in which trade takes place at non-equilibrium prices. 
Quantity constraints are perceived by the traders and effective demands and 
supplies are explicitly derived from utility and profit maximization. 
Therefore, spillover effects are taken into account whenever a quantity 
constraint is binding. Furthermore, we resolve the problem of bankruptcy as 
follows. Traders, in maximizing their objective functions, plan at the same 
time not to go bankrupt, by constraining their behavior explicitly. Such a 
constrained behavior assigns to money a role as a medium of exchange. The 
system is shown to be globally stable, when both prices and quantity 
constraints adjust in disequilibrium. 
 
Keywords: general equilibrium; utility; profit maximization;  spillover 
effects. 
 
 
 2 
Introduction   
 
 Early studies on non-tatonnement adjustments, e.g. Hahn and 
Negishi (1962) and Arron and Hann (1971), examined the stability of 
an equilibrium where transactions take place at non equilibrium 
prices. However, agents are assumed to go to the market, attempting 
to exercise their notional demands as if they can complete their 
trades. The static models of the so-called disequilibrium models 
(Benassy (1975), Dreze (1975)) took explicitly into account the 
quantity constraints that agents face in disequilibrium. Therefore, 
subsequent studies on non-tatonnement adjustments, try to 
incorporate quantity constraints in a dynamic framework and prove 
the stability of a equilibrium. Veendorp (1975), Fisher (1978), 
Eckalbar (1979) and Fisher (1981) are notable attempts towards that 
direction. However, apart from Fisher (1981), the rest of these 
papers, either do not incorporate quantity constraints explicitly 
(Fisher (1978)) or use strong assumptions i. e. gross substitutability, 
constant endowments and a three-good model (Eckalbar (1979), 
Veendorp (1975)). Fisher’s important paper takes into consideration  
quantity constraints and spillover effects, but the adjustment of 
quantity constraints that he follows is rather ad hoc as we will see 
later.  
 
 The model that we develop in this paper is closely related to 
that of Fisher’s analysis in several important aspects. First, we will 
not assume as Fisher does that traders go to the market attempting to 
exercise their notional demands. This is obviously a very strong 
assumption in this type of model where prices are temporarily fixed, 
and traders are bound to be constrained in some markets. This can be 
true as Fisher has noticed, only if the system is close to the Walrasian 
equilibrium so that notional demands are assumed to be satisfied. 
Otherwise, quantity constraints must be perceived by traders in some 
way before they go to the market. If these quantity constraints are 
imposed by an auctioneer, or are expected by the traders themselves, 
we still have to specify how these quantity constraints change over 
the time. Furthermore, spillover effects are taken into account. The 
perception of quantity constraints in some goods by a trader, forces 
him to spill over his unsatisfied demands and supplies of these goods 
in all markets. In this model we assume that purchases and sales are 
simultaneously determined (although this follows from the 
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construction of the model), so that during a given day, only the 
perceived quantity constraints affect the behavior of the traders. 
However, actual or realized transactions in that day, influence the 
behavior of the traders in the next day, through either the quantity 
constraints adjustment that the auctioneer will follow, or their 
expectations that the traders will form about the quantity constraints 
they might meet in the next day. Furthermore, the problem of 
bankruptcy is resolved.. 1Traders in maximizing their objective 
functions, plan at the same time not to go bankrupt by constraining 
their behavior explicitly. The system is shown to be globally stable 
and the stability properties are due to the fact that in disequilibrium, 
prices and quantity constraints move in such a way so as to limit the 
net demands of the traders until they become zero.  
 
 
1 .  Description of the Economy  
 
 We consider an economy with H households labeled by h and 
F firms labeled by f. There are n goods labeled by I and only one 
medium of exchange denoted by M and called money. We will now 
described how trade takes place between traders using a well known 
idealized process. This idealization has its origins in the recent static 
general disequilibrium models as developed mainly by Dreze (1975) 
and Benassy (1975).  
 
 At the beginning of each trading day the auctioneer calls out 
prices in terms of money as well as quantity constraints if prices are 
not the equilibrium ones. Households then maximize their utility 
subject to their budget and quantity constraints. Firms maximize their 
profits subject to their production function and the imposed quantity 
constraints. This maximization yields effective demands for all 
commodities by all households and firms. Trade then takes place in 
that day. However, consumption and production are postponed until 
equilibrium is reached. At the beginning of the next day, the 
auctioneer will adjust both prices and quantity constraints according 
to some rule. If for example, there is excess demand for some  
commodity, the auctioneer will increase the price of that good and at 
                                              
1This problem which is related to the Hahn process assumption is stressed by 
Abraham and Whittaker (1989) .  
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the same time he will lower the upper bound on the quantity 
demanded by the traders. It is clear that this procedure differs in two 
important aspects from that used by Fisher (1978). First, effective or 
active demands are explicitly derived from utility and profit 
maximization. Second, notional or target demands are not the starting 
point in the trading process. In other words, the system is not 
supposed to be close to the Walrasian equilibrium. Later on we will 
discuss a different approach in which traders have expectations about 
the quantity constraints they may meet in their trading process.  
 
 
2 .  Household and firm Behavior  
 
 Let xhi be the notional demand of the h th household for the i th 
good. x hi its actual holdings and p i the money price of the i th good. 
Each household receive a share from the profit of every firm, so that 
all firms are owned by households. If bhf  0 is the hth household’s 
share of the fth firm, it must be that 
h
H
hfb 1. Each household is 
assumed to maximize a strictly quasi-concave utility 
function U X Mh h h( , )
' '
, which is a function of the effective demands 
vector Xh
'
 and the effective demand for money balance Mh
'
. 
Denoting by Sh the hth household’s share in the profits of the firms 
and by dh the dividends that have already been paid to it, its budget 
constraint is:  
 P X X M M S d
ii hi
hi
h
h
h h      ( )
' ' 0            (2.1) 
where bars denote endowments and primes denote effective demands.  
 
 The quantity constraints sent out by the auctioneer to the 
households, are lower and upper bounds on their demands and are 
denoted by X
hi~
 0 and Xhi
~
 0  respectively. It is assumed that 
households do not violate the quantity constraints they perceive. The 
reason for this is the following. Since purchases and sales are 
simultaneously determined, the households do not have any advance 
information about the state of the market at the beginning of each 
trading day. The auctioneer has the relevant information regarding 
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quantity constraints and households must follow his rules which will 
be stated in section 4. Therefore, households are informed about the 
state of the market in a given period by the magnitude of their 
perceived quantity constraints. The actual state of the market, 
however, is known to all households after completion of transactions 
during that period. With regard to the behavior of households, we 
furthermore assume that they do not misrepresent their preferences in 
order to attain their goals; for example, by bidding for more, etc. On 
the other hand we must exclude the possibility of bankruptcy. This 
can be done by following Howitt (1974) and assume that all 
purchases must be backed up with money and that no household 
promises to deliver more of a good than what it actually has. At the 
beginning of each trading period, the h th household’s total money 
balances rh  are given by: r M S dh h h h   . Therefore, the 
purchases of a household in a given period cannot exceed its total 
money balances. Let zhi,  zhi
'
 and zhi

 be the notional net demand, 
effective net demand and actual or realized net demand respectively 
of household h for good i2. Then, the hth household’s maximization 
problem is the following 3.  
Max U X Mh h h( , )
' '
, subject to  
P X X M M S di hi hi h h h h
i
( )' '      0  
X X X
hi
hi hi
~
'
~
     I = 1, 2, ..., n                            (2.2) 
P z ri hi h
i Bh
'
~


    Where B
i
zh hi
  






' 0            (2.3) 
 z xhi hi
'
~
    all I such that zhi
~  0 .                       (2.4) 
 
Constraints (2.3) and (2.4) exclude the possibility of 
bankruptcy and (2.3) also demonstrates the use of money as a 
medium of exchange. Note that the above maximization problem is 
                                              
2 Actual transactions in a given period, are by definition equal to the change of the 
actual holdings within that period . The difference between notional and effective 
demands will be explained below.  
3 For more details on such a maximization problem as well as some comparative 
results , see Mackay and Weber (1977) 
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the second round of decision making according to Clower (1965). In 
the first round, households maximize their utility subject to all of the 
above constraints except those in (2.2). The net demands thus derived 
are called notional demands. If the h th  household is not constrained 
at all; if x x x
hi
hi hi
~
~
   all i, then its notional net demands are those 
which will be exercised in the market and in this case the notional 
demands are equal to the effective ones. On the other hand if the 
household is constrained in at least one market, say for good i; i.e., if 
x xhi hi
~
 or x xhi
hi

~
  , then the second round of decision making 
takes place and the hth household in maximizing its utility, will take 
into account the constraint for good i. In this case then, the demands 
and supplies of all other goods will be affected. In other words, the 
unsatisfied demand or supply of some good will spill over to all the 
other markets.   
 
 It is clear that in the above problem we have followed Dreze’s 
(1975) approach in which agents do not violate the constraints they 
perceive. As Grangmont (1977, p.560) has pointed out, there is no 
satisfactory theory explaining why traders should violate the 
constraints they perceive in some markets as Grossman (1971) and 
Benassy (1975) have assumed.  
 
 Coming up to the discussion of firms, we assume that each 
firm attempts to sell outputs and buy inputs in a competitive market. 
Since no production takes place until equilibrium is reached, firms 
issue provisional contracts to buy or sell certain quantities of goods 
at given prices. The contracts are provisional since they are binding 
only if the stated prices turn out to be the equilibrium ones. 
Otherwise new contracts will have to be established. Hence, net 
demands and supplies by firms are in the form of contracts. Let Y fi  
0  denote the notional supply of good i by the f th firm.  Using the 
conventional notation inputs are measured negatively and outputs 
positively. If Yfi  denotes the realized or actual contracts of the f th 
firm for the i th good, then E Y Yfi fi fi   is the net notional supply (if 
positive) or net demand (if negative) of the i th commodity by the fth 
firm. We assume that money is used in the production process as an 
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input and denote by Mf and Mf  the notional and actual money 
holdings of the f th firm. The production relation of the f firm is 
denoted by f f fY M( , )
' '  0 , where Yf
'
 denotes the vector of its 
effective demands and supplies and Mf
'
 denotes the effective demand 
for money for production purposes.  
 
 The quantity constraints perceived by the f th firm are upper 
bounds on its net supplies and lower bounds on its net demands. We 
denote these bounds by Efi
~
 0   and E
fi~
 0  respectively. What has 
said about such constraints in the case of households, applies also in 
the case of firms. Here, we also have to exclude the case of 
bankruptcy. At any given period of time, the f th firm has realized a 
certain amount of profits through past trading denoted by f . An 
explicit account on these profits will be given below. Out of these 
profits, the fth firm has to pay its shareholders. Denoting by q f the 
total payments that the f th firm makes to its shareholders, the total 
money held by the f th firm is given by r q Mf f f f   . We now 
assume that all purchases of the f th firm must not exceed its 
transactions balances and that it never promises to deliver more of a 
good than it can produce. Formally then, the f th firm’s maximization 
problem is the following:  
 max   f i
i
fi fi f f fP Y Y M M     ' '  subject to, 
  f f fY M' ',  0  
 Y Y Y
fi
fi fi
~
'
~
     all I                                                          (2.5) 
   

P E qi fi f f
i Bf
'   where B
i
Ef fi
 






' 0                      (2.6) 
 E Yfi fi
' '  
where Yfi
~
 0  and Y
fi~
 0  are upper and lower bounds on 
transactions and primes denote effective demands. Constraints (2.6) 
and (2.7) constitute the no bankruptcy condition and the profits f  
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which have realized in the past, up until the present time t are given 
by  
 
      f i fi f
i
t
ft P Y M d( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) 





 
 
0 0  
 
where 0 is some initial date.  
 
 Since trade takes place at disequilibrium prices, the f th firm 
will not be able at any moment of time to realize its profits f . 
Instead  the f th firm will receive an amount f  which must be greater 
than the payment qf that it will make to its shareholders. Later on we 
will see that in equilibrium all profits are realized and distributed to 
the households, so that f fq . However, in disequilibrium 
q f f  and the difference f fq  represents the amount of money 
held for transactions purposes; i.e., for the purchase of inputs. It is 
now clear that the h th household’s share of firms profits Sh and the 
dividends dh are defined as follows:  
 
 S bh hf f
f
   d b qh hf f
f
 . 
 
Note that there is no rule about the payments q f that the firm makes to 
its shareholders. It is only required that f fq   and that there must 
exist some money balances to be used for the purchase of inputs. 
Hence, the no bankruptcy condition (2.6) determines the amount q f 
that the fth firm will distribute. This is absent in Fisher’s (1974) 
model. On the other hand, the firm in maximizing its profits takes 
into account the fact that its contracts will be binding when 
equilibrium is reached and production begins. Furthermore, spillover 
effects affect the demands and supplies of every firm which perceives 
quantity constraints that limit its notional demands or supplies. 
Hence, the above maximization is the second round of decision 
making by firms. The first round is similar to that described in the 
case of households. We also assume that the above maximization 
problem yields unique demands and supplies by the firm so that 
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constant returns to scale are excluded. The reason for this  
requirement will become clear in section 6.  
 
 As will be seen below, the auctioneer follows certain rules in 
adjusting quantity constraints in disequilibrium situations. Since the 
auctioneer can have a knowledge of the endowments and the actual 
contracts of the agents without knowing their preferences and 
production functions, the quantity constraints that he sends must 
satisfy the following consistency conditions:          
 X Y Xhi fi hi
hf
~
   all I, h                                     (2.8) 
   Y X Y
fj
hi fi
fh
~
  all j, f                                      (2.9) 
 X Y
hi
fi
~
~
, 0 0  all h, f, I                                (2.10) 
 
Condition (2.8) states that a household cannot demand more 
of a good than what can actually be supplied by all traders and (2.9) 
states that a firm cannot demand more of a input than can actually be 
supplied by all traders. Note that the auctioneer has no way of 
restricting the supplies of households or firms, since he does not 
know either their preferences or their production functions and 
therefore he does not know their effective demands. Hence, (2.10) 
requires only that X
hi~
 and Yfi
~
 be non-negative in order to be 
meaningful.  
 
 
3.  Assumptions and Trading Rules  
 
 Since production and consumption are postponed until 
equilibrium is reached, we postulate the following:  
 Assumption 3.1   
 
X Yhi fi
fh
 
  0  i = 1, 2, ..., n .  
Assumption 3.1 states that any change in the endowments of 
households is due to a change in actual contracts of firms. A similar 
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condition can be applied to money whose quantity is assumed to be 
fixed:  
 
 Assumption 3.2  
M M qh
h
f
f
f
f
  
     0 . 
 
 Having each household and firm complete their transactions 
during a trading period, their money balances at the end of the period 
or at the beginning of the next period will depend on the actual 
transactions of the previous period. We have seen that M S dh h h   
is the amount of money that the h th household spends for the purchase 
of goods. Hence, the rate of decrease of these balances during a 
trading period, depends on the actual purchases of that period; i.e.,  
 M S d P Xh h h i
i B
hi
h
  


     all h.                                     (3.1) 
However, the difference between initial and end-of-period money 
balances depends on the actual transactions performed.  
Hence, we have: 
 
 Assumption 3.3  
 M d P Xh h i
i
hi
  
    all h. 
 A similar reasoning applies in the case of firms. The money 
balances held by the f th firm for the purchase of inputs is given by 
f fq . The rate of decrease of these balances during a trading 
period, depends on the actual purchases made: 
 
 


  f f i
i B
fiq P Y
f
 all f                                               (3.2) 
However, the total change of money balances, positive or negative, 
within a trading period, depends on the actual transactions of that 
period. 4 
 
                                              
4 Assumption 3 . 4 can be derived by differentiating the definition of realized 
profits on p . 9 .  
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 Assumption 3.4  
 
  
 f i
i
fi fP Y M   all f 
 By combining (3.2) with Assumption 3.4 it is interesting to 
see that q P Y M
f i
i B
fi f
f


 
    which states that the larger the sales 
of the fth firm, the larger its revenue will be and therefore the larger 
the amount that it will distribute to its shareholders.  
 
 We are now in a position to derive Walras’ Law for this 
economy. Summing up over all households the budget constraint (2.1) 
and taking into account the definitions of profits, shares and 
dividends we get Walras’ Law: 
     P Z P E M M M M qi hi i fi h h
hfihi
f f f f
ff
' ' ' '          0       (3.3) 
 
 
4. Price-Quantity Adjustments and the Hahn Process Assumption  
 
 As we stated in the beginning, after the end of each trading 
period, the auctioneer has the task of adjusting both prices and 
quantity constraints if the economy is not in equilibrium. The rules 
that he follows are stated in the following assumption. First we 
define Z Z Ei hi
h
fi
f
' ' '   .  
 Assumption 4.1  
(i)  
 
P
if P and Z
H Z otherwise
i
i i
i i


 



0 0 0'
' .
 
 
(ii)  
 
X
F Z if Z and Z Z
if Z
hi
hi hi hi hi hi
hi
~ ' ' '
~
'


  





0
0 0
 
  
 
 
X
G Z if Z and Z Z
if Zhj
hj hj hj hj hj
hj
~
' ' '
'


  





0
0 0
 
 12 
 
(iii)  
 
Y
F E if E and E E
if E
fi
fi fi fi fi fi
fi
~ ' ' '
~
'


  





0
0 0
 
 
 
Y
G E if E and E E
if Efj
fj fj fj fj fj
fj
~
' ' '
'


  





0
0 0
 
 
where F (....) and G (....) are sign preserving functions in their 
arguments and furthermore H i(0)= 0. Moreover, we assume that 
quantity constraints are stationary for those goods which are in 
excess supply and their prices are zero.  
 
 The price adjustments rule in (I) is well known and needs no 
explanation5. The quantity adjustment rule in (ii) and (iii) states that, 
in general, upper and lower quantity constraints which are binding 
can become stricter but not looser. Quantity constraints which are not 
binding in the maximization process of the agents, remain stationary 
since they are not restrictive. Hence, for example, in situations of a 
positive net effective demand for some good by a household, the 
upper bound on the household’s demand will be decreased. The Hahn 
process Assumption that will be stated in a moment will help us to 
elaborate more on this rule. First, note an asymmetry between the 
price adjustment rule and the quantity adjustment one. In the former, 
prices respond to the aggregate net effective demands whereas in the 
latter quantity constraints respond only to individual ones. This is, 
however, done as the following example shows, in order to exclude 
some unnecessary adjustments from taking place. Suppose that all but 
one agent’s effective net demands for all goods are zero. For some 
household h we assume that there is a good i such Zhi
'  0  and 
Z Zhi hi
~
' . We furthermore assume that all quantity constraints for 
good i are binding for all traders. Then, if quantity constraints 
                                              
5 Champsaur , Dreze and Henry (1977) have shown that under fairly weak 
assumptions , this rule does not create any discontinuities in the trajectories of the 
system . Their method can also ensure that the quantity adjustment rule in (ii) and 
(iii) does not violate the Lipschitz conditions .   
 13 
respond according to individual net effective demands as in 
Assumption 4.1 (ii), (iii), the auctioneer will only limit the h th 
household’s transaction for the ith good. On the other hand, if we 
suppose that quantity constraints respond to aggregate net effective 
demands, the auctioneer would have to adjust in this case all agent’s 
quantity constraints, which demand this good, even if their respect ive 
net individual demands for this good are zero. This is the reason for 
not allowing a quantity adjustment rule of the latter type, although in 
every other respect both rules are equivalent (as we shall see) if the 
Hahn process Assumption holds. The functions F and the G which are 
different for each household and firm, may include any form of 
rationing imposed by the auctioneer.  
 
 The next Assumption that will be stated is the usual Hahn 
process Assumption as stated in Hahn and Negishi (1960), which is, 
however, applied to effective demands.  
 
 Assumption 4.2  
 
 Zhi
'  0  implies Z Zhi i
' '  0  
and Efi
'  0  implies E Zhi i
' '  0  all h, f, I and all t  0 . 
 
 Assumption 4.2 states that if ex post  a household or firm has 
excess demand for some good, then the aggregate net effective 
demand for this good is positive. This Assumption must hold at all 
times and it is a natural consequence of trade provided that every 
supplier of a good can find a demander of this good and vice versa. It 
is different than the modified Hahn process Assumption as stated in 
Fisher (1978, p.21) which postulates that Z Zhi i
'  0 . This 
Assumption turns out to be pretty strong as Fisher has indicated when 
the long side of a market switches to a short one and vice versa. In 
essence, Assumption 4.2 precludes the coexistence of net effective 
demand and net effective supply in the market of any good. What this 
implies then, is that an agent is constrained only if he is in the long 
side of the market and the actual constraint that he perceives in this 
case is more severe than the one sent out by the auctioneer. On the 
other hand, traders in the short side of the market do not perceive any 
actual quantity constraint even if some of the respective constraints 
imposed by the auctioneer are binding. Therefore those agents always 
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realize their plans, in the sense that their effective net demands will 
be met.  
 
 It is now clear in the quantity adjustment rule (ii) and (iii) in 
Assumption 4.1, that although quantity constraints respond to 
individual net effective demands, implicitly they respond to the 
aggregate ones, since by Assumption 4.2 individual net effective 
demands have the same sign as the aggregate ones. Therefore, we 
have allowed individual net effective demands rather than aggregate 
to activate the quantity adjustment mechanism since this kind of 
adjustment is weaker as it was seen on p.43.  
 
 Coming back now to our discussion concerning the quantity 
adjustment rule in Assumption 4.1, we see that in situations of a 
positive net effective demand for some good, the upper bounds on 
households’ transactions and lower bounds on firms’ transactions 
will get stricter, provided their quantity constraints for this good are 
binding. However, the lower and the upper bounds on households and 
firms’ transactions respectively remain unchanged. This implies that 
those agents who ex ante had excess supply of this good will not have 
the opportunity to increase it. The reason for the establishment of 
such a rule is due to Assumption 4.2  which implies that only one 
side of the market is binding. That is why the auctioneer in situations 
of an aggregate net effective demand for some good, will only restrict 
the transactions of net demanders for this good since the quantity 
constraints sent by the auctioneer to the net suppliers of this good are 
irrelevant to the long side of the market, even if some of them may be 
binding. Therefore, quantity constraints are adjusted only if it is 
necessary; i.e., only if they belong to the long side of the market. 
Quantity constraints which belong to the short side of the market are 
not adjusted since agents in this side realize their plans. Hence, each 
time quantity constraints are adjusted so as to make agents always 
worse off in the sense that more severe constraints will have to be 
imposed on traders in the long side of the market.  
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5 . Equilibrium and Disequilibrium  
 
        Definition 5.1  
 
 The economy is in a competitive equilibrium, if and only if 
Z M Mi h h
' ', 0  and M Mf f
'   for all h, f, i. Furthermore, for 
every h, f and i, Z Zhi hi
' 

 and E Efi fi
' 

.   
  
It is seen from the definition of equilibrium, that since 
effective and not notional demands are zero, persistent disequilibrium 
in Varian’s (1975) terminology will always arise. Using the 
definition of equilibrium and Walra’s Law (3.5), we see that since 
prices are no-negative and f fq  we must have Pi=0 for  Zi
'  0  
and q f f   all f, for Walras’ Law to hold. Also, using the definition 
of profits we see that  f f  so that all profits are distributed to the 
households. Furthermore, the only money balances held by the firms 
in equilibrium, are those needed in the production process since 
f fq . From definition 5.1 and Assumption 4.2 it is clear that 
individual demands will also be zero for all non-free goods. This 
implies that no actual transfer of goods takes place in equilibrium, 
since everyone’s demands are equal to his actual holdings; i.e., 
X Xhi hi
'   and Y Yfi fi
'   all h, f, i. Hence, we may say that there is no 
trade at equilibrium, even though trade has been taking place in the 
past up until the establishment of equilibrium. However, there is a 
case in which trade cannot take place at all and the system is in 
equilibrium. This case which we call “artificial’’ equilibrium is 
described as follows. At time t=0, the auctioneer knows the actual 
holdings of all agents without knowing their preferences or 
production functions. In such a case he can eliminate every 
possibility for trading by sending to all agents quantity signals equal 
to their actual holdings; i.e., X X Xhi hi hi( ) ( ) ( )
~
0 0 0   and 
Y Y Yfi fi
f
( ) ( ) ( )
~
~
0 0 0   all h, f, i.  It is evident that this is 
sufficient to establish since all agents’ demands are restricted to their 
initial holdings and the maximization procedures eg households and 
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firms described in section 2 will produce demands and supplies such 
that X Xhi hi
'  and Y Yfi fi
'  . For example, if a households has 
excess demand for good i, then its best choice is Xhi
~
 which is equal 
to is endowment of good i. Therefore, we must exclude such a 
peculiar case which may also rise at some t>o. In other words, the 
auctioneer may wish at any time to establish an artificial equilibrium 
as defined below.  
   
 Definition 5.2  
  
 An artificial equilibrium at time t0 , is a state in which all 
upper and lower quantity constraints by all agents coincide with their 
actual holdings.  
 
 A sufficient condition to exclude an artificial equilibrium is 
given below.  
 
 Assumption 5.1  
 
 For every t0 out of equilibrium, there is at least a household 
h, a firm and a good i, such that for household h, 
X t X t X thi hi hi( ) ( ) ( )
~
'   and Z thi
' ( )  0  and for firm f, 
Y t Y t Y tfi fi fi( ) ( ) ( )
~
'   and E tfi
' ( )  0 . 
 
 Assumption 5.1 states that out of equilibrium, not all quantity 
constraints are binding and that not all effective excess demands are 
zero. The latter is sufficient to allow trading to take place at t=0 and 
the former is sufficient to exclude an artificial equilibrium at t>0.  
 
 Lemma 5.1  
 
 Under Assumption 5.1 an artificial equilibrium is impossible.  
 
 Proof  
 At time t=0 trade will obviously take place since there is a 
supplier of good i and a demander for good i whose net demands are 
not zero. At some t>0, suppose that an artificial equilibrium is 
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established. By Assumption 4.1 upper quantity constraints of 
households which are binding , always decline. Hence, there is a t’ 
close to t and t’<t, such that for all agents whose excess demand were 
not zero at t’, Z t Z thi hi
'
~
( ' ) ( ' )  and E t E tfi fi
'
~
( ' ) ( ' )  which 
contradicts Assumption 5.1..  
 
 We now proceed to show that the profits of firms decline out 
of equilibrium. This is so because prices and quantity constraints 
change in such a way so as to take firms worse off. For example, 
some goods that firms are unable to sell become cheaper, whereas 
some others that they cannot acquire become expensive.  On the other 
hand those quantity constraints which are binding become stricter. 
Assuming that the sets Q
j
E E
f
fj fj
~
~









 and Q
k
E E
f
fk
fk









~
 are 
not null, so that firms cannot transact all of their notional demands, 
we have the next Lemma.  
 
 Lemma 5.2  
 

f 0  out of equilibrium and 

f 0 , if and only if the 
economy is in equilibrium.  
 
 Proof  
 Since each firm is a profit maximize and in disequilibrium it 
is adversely affected by changes in prices and quantity constraints, to 
show that profits decline out of equilibrium i.e. essentially the same 
as showing that the maximum profit of each firm declines. The 
Lagrangean of the f th firm is given by:  
    L P Y Y M M Y M Y Yf i fi fi f f f f f f f gk
k Qf fk
fk
i
       
 

 

 ' ' ' '
~
',
~
     
    fj fj fj f f f fi
i B
fi
i
fi fi
j Qf
Y Y q E Y E
f
~
' ' ' '
 

   





  

  . 
 
We know that at the optimum, Lf is a function of prices, actual 
holdings and quantity constraints and it is known as the profit 
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function. Differentiating then this function with respect to time 
yields:  
 L P Y Y P Y M Y Y
q P Y PE Y
f i fi fi i fi
i
f f fk
fkk Qf j Qf
fj fj
i
f f f i
i B
fi f fi fi
i
fi
i Bf f
     
 
 

  

    





 














 
  





  
  
 

'
'
~
~
~
'
~
  
   
 
 
The first term is negative out of equilibrium by Assumptions 4.1 and 
4.2 and zero in equilibrium. For the same reason the sixth term is also 
non-positive. The second and fifth terms are zero by Assumption 3.4 
and (3.2) respectively. The third and fourth terms are negative out of 
equilibrium and zero in equilibrium, since Y
fk~

 0  and Yfj
~

 0  by 
Assumption 4.1 and 

fk
f
fk
L
V
  
~
0  and 


fî
f
fj
L
Y
 ~ 0 . 
Finally the last term is negative out of equilibrium and zero in 
equilibrium since fi  0  and Y Efi fi
 
  0  all i. The multiplier 
  fk fj  represents the marginal decrease (increase) in profits by 
tightening (loosening) the kth (jth) quantity constraint. Therefore, 
bearing in mind the previous remarks, the profits of firms always 
decline out of equilibrium and are stationary if and only if the 
economy is in equilibrium.  
 
 The above results will be helpful in proving the next Lemma. 
First we define the following two sets Q
j
Z Z
h
hj hj
~
~









 and 
Q
k
Z Z
h
hk
hk
~
~










 which we assume to be non-null, so that notional 
demands and supplies of some goods cannot be transacted.  
 
 
 19 
 Lemma 5.3  
 Let Vh denote the indirect utility function of the h th 
household. Then, Vh

 0  out of equilibrium and Vh

 0  if and only 
if the economy is in equilibrium.  
 
 Proof  
 The Lagrangean of the h th household is:   
   V U X M P X X M M S d X Xh h h h h h
i
hi hi h h h h hj
j Q
hi hj
h
      





  


 

  

' ' ' ' '
~
,
~
 
  


    





  
 
   hk
k Q
hk
hk
h h h i
i B
hi hi hi hi
ih h
X X M S d P Z X Z
~
'
~
' ' . 
At the optimum this Lagrangean is a function of prices, endowments, 
quantity constraints, shares and dividends and is known as the 
indirect utility function. Differentiating it with respect to time yields:  
 V P X X P X M d S Xh h i
i
hi hi h h
i
hi h h h h hj
j Q
hj
h
     

     





     

   '
~
~
 
    





   







   

 

 
      hk
k Q hk
h h h h i
i B
hi h
i B
hi hi
i
hi hi
h
h h
X M S d P X P Z X X
~
~
' . 
The first and seventh terms are negative by Assumption 4.1 
and 4.2 unless there is equilibrium in which case they are both zero. 
The second and sixth terms are zero by Assumption 3.3 and (3.1) 
respectively. The third term can be written as  h hf f
f
b

  and since 
h  0  and bhf  0 , by Lemma 5.2 it is negative out of equilibrium 
and zero in equilibrium. the fourth and fifth terms are non-positive 
out of equilibrium since Xhj
~

 0  and X
hk~

 0  by assumption 4.1 and 



hj
h
hj
V
X
 ~ 0  and 

hk
h
hk
V
X
 
~
0 . At equilibrium, however, 
X Xhj
hk
~
~

 

0  by the same Assumption. The last term is also zero. 
The multiplier   hj hk  represents the marginal increase (decrease) 
in utility by loosening (tightening) the  j kth th  quantity constraint.  
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6.   Stability 
 
 Note that the previous Lemma holds for every regime which 
will be defined below. Since different agents will be constrained in 
different markets, the rate of change of the state variables of the 
system (i.e., prices, endowments and quantity constraints) will be 
governed by a different differential equation depending on the 
prevailing market conditions. A particular regime then defines a 
particular market condition. Since market condition change 
continuously during the adjustment process,  stability of the system 
must be examined in all possible market conditions or regimes. The 
next theorem is a generalization of theorem 2 in Eckalbar (1980) and 
is the main tool in showing the stability of our system.  Consider the 
following system of autonomous equations defined on the different 
regimes Si as follows:   
X
f X if X S R i m
f X f X if X S S
i i n
i j i j


  
    




( ) , , ,
( ) ( )
1 2 
 
  (A) 
where X belongs to an open set W Rn  and U S Wi
i  .  To each 
regime Si we associate a Lyapunov function which is defined as 
follows: 
 
 Definition 6 . 2  
 Let V : W  R such that,  
V X
V X if X S i m
V X V X if X S S
i i
i j i j
( )
( ) , , , ,
( ) ( )

 
    




1 2 
 
 
satisfying: 
a)  D+Vi(X) < 0 in W\E, i = 1, 2, ..., m. 
D+Vi(X) = 0 only if X is an equilibrium of (A)  i =  1, 2, ..., m 
where 
 
D V X
h
V X hf X V X
h
i
i i i
 


 
( ) lim sup
( ) ( )
0
 denotes 
the right-hand time derivative of V i and 
E
X
D V X
X Si
i  






 ( )
,0  denotes the equilibrium set of (A).  
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 Theorem 6 . 1  
 
 Consider system (A) and assume that it satisfies the Lipschitz 
conditions. Suppose there exists a locally Lipschitzian Lyapunov 
function as defined above and let X(t) be any bounded solution of 
(A). Then lim(X)E as t, i.e., solution path approaches the 
equilibrium set of (A)6. 
 
 Proof  
 
 The trajectory X (t) may pass from one or more regimes 
depending on the initial conditions. Since it is bounded, there is a 
convergent subsequent such that X(tn)X* as tn. Since V(X(t)) is 
decreasing and bounded from below, there is some CR that 
V(X(tn))C as tn. By the continuity of V in all regimes we must 
have V(X*)=C.  But V is decreasing and therefore V(X(tn))C as 
tn for every limit point X*.  Hence; D+V(X*)=0 and using b) 
X*E.  Since X(t) is bounded for t0, X(t)E as t.  This shows 
that every solution path of (A) converges to the set of equilibria.  
 
 We can now proceed by showing that our economy has a 
quasi-globally stable adjustment process. First we need the following 
result. 
  
 Lemma 6 . 1  
 
 The time path of prices, actual holdings and quantity 
constraints is bounded.  
 
 Proof  
    
 Fisher (1974) has shown that prices and actual holdings are 
bounded and his proof is applicable in our model. The upper bounds 
                                              
6Using the properties of limit set , a more elegant form of this Theorem is known as 
the Invariance Principle . See LaSalle and Lefschetz (1961 , Section 13) and 
Lasalle (1968) . Uzawa (1961 , Theorem 1) has shown that the Lyapunov function 
need not be decreasing as long as it is convergent . His proof can also be used to 
establish the theorem . See also Arrow and Hahn (1971 , ch . 11 , thoerem 3)  
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Xhi
~
 and Yfi
~
 are also bounded since Xhi
~
 0  and Yfi
~
 0  and 
X Yhi fi
~ ~
,
 
 0 0  in disequilibrium by Assumption 4.1. The lower 
bound X
hj~
 is bounded from below since it is positive. The firms' 
lower bounds Y
fj~
 are also bounded from below by (2.9) Both X
hj~
 
and Y
fj~
 are increasing in disequilibrium by Assumption 4.1, up to 
the point where Z j
'  0 . At that point, however, individual net 
demands are zero, so that X X
hi
hj
~
  0  and Y Y
fj
fj
~
  0 . Clearly 
then the lower bounds are also from above since endowments are 
bounded.  
 
 To show quasi-global stability we assume that there are J 
different regimes or market conditions denoted by S r, r = 1, 2, ..., J. 
In what follows a superscript r on a function denotes the 
corresponding regime.  
 
 Theorem 6 . 2 
 
 The economy has a quasi-globally stable adjustment process, 
i.e., every limit point is a equilibrium.  
 
 Proof  
 Let V t Vr h
r
h
( )   if Vhr  belongs to regime Sr, r = 1, 2, ..., J. 
Since Lemma 5.3 holds for every regime, it is easy to show that 
V(t)=Vr(t) r = 1, 2, ..., J is a Lyapunov function. Since endowments 
are bounded, Vr(t) is bounded from below by the initial endowments 
of households. By Lemma 5.3, V t
r
( ) 0  if and only if Zi
'  0  all i, 
r. At equilibrium, however, V t
r
( ) 0  by the same Lemma. Hence, 
Vr(t) satisfies the assumptions of Theorem 6.1 and therefore every 
path of prices, endowments and quantity constraints converges to 
some equilibrium.  
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 Although we have shown that the economy will approach 
some equilibrium from any initial point, it is desirable to know 
whether the adjustment process converges to a unique equilibrium 
starting from a given initial point. A nice way to do this is that 
originated by Arrow and Hahn (1971) and generalized later on by 
Fisher (1974). The method of proof uses the expenditure 
minimization and profit maximization to show that all limit points of 
the process are the same. The same method of proof can be employed 
here. However, in order to prove that prices converge to the same 
limit point we need the following Assumption.  
 
 Assumption 6 . 1  
 
 At any equilibrium, for any pair of goods (including money) 
with strictly positive prices, at least one of the following is true: a) 
There is some h and two goods i and j, such that Xhi
'  0  and 
Xhj
'  0 . b) There is some f and two goods i and j such that Yfi
'  0   
and Yfj
'  0 . 
 
 Assumption 6.1 which has been used by Fisher (1974), 
effectively rules out corner solutions, so that some agent's marginal 
rate of substitution between any two goods with positive prices 
determines their respective price ratio.  
 
 Theorem 6 . 3  
 
 The economy has a globally stable adjustment process, i . e., 
starting from a given initial point it converges to a unique 
equilibrium.  
 
 Proof  
 
 Since the adjustment process is quasi-globally stable and the 
path of prices, endowments and quantity constraints is bounded,  we 
need only show that all limit points of the process are the same. By 
Lemma 5.3 every household's utility approaches a limit, say Uh . Let 
P X M X Xh
h
* * *
~ *
~
*, , , ,  be the limit points of the path of prices, 
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endowments and quantity constraints and let Xh
' *
 and Mh
' *
 be the 
respective limit points of effective demands. Suppose now that there 
is another set of limit points denoted by Xh
' **
 and Mh
' **
. Since the 
limiting value Uh  is the same for every limit point: 
   U X M U X M Uh h h h h h h' * ' * ' ** ' **, ,   all h .  
Since U is strictly quasi-concave, 
P X M P X Mi
i
hi h i
i
hi h
* ' * ' * * ' ** ' **    . 
In equilibrium all profits are distributed to the households, so 
that using the budget constraint (2.1) we get: 
 P X M P X Mi
i
hi h i
i
hi h
* * * * ** **                                     (6.1) 
 On the other hand, since Yf
' *
 and M f
' *
 is a unique profit 
maximizing choice (note that we have excluded constant returns to 
scale) 
 P Y M P Y Mi
i
fi f i
i
fi f
* ' * ' * * ' ** ' **     
and by the fact that Y Y Mfi fi f
' * ' ** ' *, ,  and Mf
' **
 are equilibrium points,  
 P Y M P Y Mi
i
fi f i
i
fi f
* * * * ** **                                        (6.2) 
Summing up (6 . 1) over all households and (6.2) over firms and then 
summing both inequalities up and rearranging yields: 
       P X X M M P Y Y M Mi
i
hi hi h h i
i
fi fi f f
ffhh
* ** * ** * * * ** * **           0   
(6.3) 
By Assumptions 3.1 and 3.2 we get  
X Y M M qhi
h
fi
f
h
h
f
f
f
f
    
         0                       (6.4) 
Since in equilibrium q f f  , then q f f
 
  0  by Lemma 5.2. 
Summing (6.2) over all goods yields:  
 X Y M Mhi
i
fi
if
h
h
f
fh
   
        0  
which contradicts (6.3) . Hence, there is one set of limit points of 
effective demands and therefore one set of limit points of actual 
holdings. Obviously then, quantity constraints which are binding will 
be the same in both equilibria.  
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 Now consider the convergence of prices. The first order 
conditions for utility maximization imply that for household h and 
some good j Q
h

~
  
 


  
U
X
P P Xh
hj
h j hj h j hj'
'  





  0 . 
By Assumption 6 .1 the marginal rate of substitution between 
any such good and money (which is the same at both equilibria) 
determines a unique money price since the Lagranfe multipliers hj
*
 
and hj
**
 must be the same at both equilibria; i.e., 





hj
h
hj
h
hj
hj
V
X
V
X
*
*
~ *
*
~ **
**   ; for the quantity constraints Xhj
~ *
 and Xhj
~ **
 
must be binding at both equilibria (and therefore are equal) otherwise 
hj
*
 and hj
**
 are both zero by the Kuhn-Tucker conditions. Similarly 
h
*
 and h
**
 must be the same if they are not zero. The same is true 
for every good k Qh
~
 and similar reasoning applies in the case of 
firms. Hence, prices converge to a unique limit point and thus the 
proof is completed.  
 
 
7 . An Alternative Approach  
 
 In the model we have already examined, the auctioneer had 
the dual role of adjusting both prices and quantity constraints after 
each trading day. In the present section we will assume that the role 
of the auctioneer is limited to adjusting only the prices. However, 
when false trading takes place and prices are fixed during the trading 
day, it is unrealistic to suppose, as Fisher (1978) admits, that notional 
demands of agents are a starting point in the trading process, 
especially when quantity constraints have been perceived by the 
agents in the past. Hence, we assume that at the beginning of each 
trading day, the auctioneer calls out a given price vector which will 
remain fixed in that day. Agents are assumed to have expectations 
about the quantity constraints that they will meet in their transactions 
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during the day. These expectations are assumed to be held with 
certainty and that they follow a simple rule which will be stated in a 
moment. Each agent maximizes his objective function subject to the 
relevant constraints. The maximization procedure are the same as in 
section 2 and need not be repeated. Essentially all of our previous 
Assumption hold, except for Assumption 4.1 which now reads as 
follows.     
(i)             
 
P
if P and Z
H Z otherwise
i
i i
i i


 



0 0 0'
' .
 
 
(ii)  X
Z Z if Z Z and Z Z
if Z Z
hi
hi hi hi hi hi hi
hi hi
~
' ' '
~
'


 


 

   






 

 0
0
 
  
 X
Z Z if Z Z and Z Z
if Z Z
hj
hj hj hj hj hj
hj
hj hj
~
' ' '
~
'

 


 
 

   






 0
0
 
 
(iii)  Y
E E if E E and E E
if E E
fi
fi fi fi fi fi fi
fi fi
~
' ' '
~
'


 


 

   






 

 0
0
 
 
Y
E E if E E and E E
if E E
fj
fj fj fj fj fj
fj
fj fj
~
' ' '
~
'

 


 
 

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where , , ,  are positive constants. 
 
 The quantity adjustment rule in (ii) and (iii) shows that 
change in those expected quantity constraints which are binding tend 
to be unfavorable, in the sense that they always become stricter. The 
reason for this is the following. Suppose that a household attempts to 
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exercise its excess demand for some good without violating its 
expected upper bound. If its effective demand is greater than its 
actual or realised transaction, then the household realizes that its 
actual constraint was more severe than the one that was expected. 
Therefore, the household will have to adjust the upper bound 
downwards provided that it was binding; other-wise the upper bound 
remains unchanged. On the other hand if it succeeds in completing its 
transaction, so that its effective and actual transaction for this good 
coincide, then there is no reason to adjust its upper bound, no matter 
whether it was binding or not. It might actually decide to buy more 
than its effective demand if it wishes to do so. However, such a 
behavior would not be optimal, since the optimal net demands are 
given as solutions to the maximization problem of each agent subject 
to the relevant constraints. On the other hand, since purchases and 
sales are simultaneously determined, such a behavior is ruled out.  
 
 At this point, we should note that the quantity adjustment rule 
in (ii) and (iii) is different than the one presented by Fisher (1981). 
7Fisher's adjustment rule only requires that quantity constraints which 
are close to binding become stricter. However, this implies that an 
agent will keep adjusting his upper and lower bounds of some goods 
even if his effective net demands coincide with his actual ones; i.e., 
even if his net demands for these goods are satisfied. The reason for 
this peculiar result is that agents in Fisher's model do not adjust their 
quantity constraints according to the market conditions but according 
to whether or not these constraints are binding.  
 
 It is now easily seen, that using Assumption 7.1 instead of 
4.1, all of our previous results hold. Hence, the system is again 
globally stable when prices are adjusted by the auctioneer and 
quantity constraints are adjusted by the traders themselves. The 
reason for such a stability result is the same as in the previous 
sections. Prices and quantity constraints move unfavorably in 
disequilibrium so that each time the net effective demands of agents 
decline until they become zero.  
 
                                              
7Actually, Fisher's quantity adjustment rule is stated explicitly only in his M.I.T. 
discussion paper No.231 (1979), which is an extended version of his published 
work (1981). Our discussion is concerned with the former.  
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